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Passive faraday mirror attack in practical two-way quantum key distribution system
Shi-Hai Sun, Mu-Sheng Jiang, Lin-Mei Liang∗
Department of Physics, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, P.R.China
The faraday mirror (FM) plays a very important role in maintaining the stability of two way
plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. However, the practical FM is imperfect,
which will not only introduce additional quantum bit error rate (QBER) but also leave a loophole
for Eve to spy the secret key. In this paper, we propose a passive faraday mirror attack in two way
QKD system based on the imperfection of FM. Our analysis shows that, if the FM is imperfect, the
dimension of Hilbert space spanned by the four states sent by Alice is three instead of two. Thus
Eve can distinguish these states with a set of POVM operators belonging to three dimension space,
which will reduce the QBER induced by her attack. Furthermore, a relationship between the degree
of the imperfection of FM and the transmittance of the practical QKD system is obtained. The
results show that, the probability that Eve loads her attack successfully depends on the degree of
the imperfection of FM rapidly, but the QBER induced by Eve’s attack changes with the degree of
the imperfection of FM slightly.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] admits two re-
mote parties, known as Alice and Bob, to share uncon-
ditional secret key, even the eavesdropper (Eve) has ul-
timate power admitted by the quantum mechanics. Al-
though the unconditional security have been proved for
both the ideal system [2, 3] and the practical system
[4, 5] in past years, some assumptions are set to limit
Eve’s attack strategy or to ignore some imperfections ex-
isted in the practical QKD system. Generally speaking,
the practical QKD system is imperfect. Any deviation
between the standard security analysis and the practi-
cal QKD system will leave a loophole for Eve to obtain
more information. In the worst case, Eve can exploit all
these imperfections together to maximize her information
about the secret key. Thus it is important to do research
on the practical QKD system carefully and close these
loopholes to guarantee the unconditional security of key.
In fact, some potential attacks using the imperfection of
a practical QKD system have been discovered, for exam-
ple, timing side channel attack [6], faked states attack
[7], blinding attack [8], Trojan-horse attacks [9], time-
shifted attack [10, 11], phase-remapping attack [12, 13].
Therefore, when the QKD system is used in the practi-
cal situation, the legitimate parties should consider the
potential attack according to any imperfection existed in
the practical system and find defense strategies against
them.
In all the practical QKD system based on long distance
fiber, the major difficulty is to maintain the stability and
compensate the birefringence of fiber. In order to re-
solve this problem, Muller et al. proposed an interesting
two-way plug-and-play scheme [14], which can compen-
sate the birefringence automatically. In this system, Bob
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sends a strong reference pulse to Alice. Then Alice en-
codes her information to the reference pulse, attenuates
it to single photon level, and sends it back to Bob. Since
the pulse travels back and forth in the quantum channel,
the birefringence is compensated automatically. How-
ever, since Alice admits the pulse go in and go out of
her zone, it will leave a backdoor for Eve to implement
variable Trojan-horse attack [9–13].
In this paper, we propose a passive faraday mirror
(PFM) attack in two way plug-and-play QKD system
based on the imperfection of faraday mirror (FM) which
plays a very important role in compensating the bire-
fringence of fiber. Our results show that, for the BB84
protocol [1], when the FM deviates from the ideal sit-
uation, the dimension of Hilbert space spanned by the
states sent by Alice is three instead of two. Thus it will
give Eve more information to spy the secret key. When
the legitimate parties are unaware of our attack, uncon-
ditional security of the generated key must be compro-
mised. Thus, in practical situation, it is very important
for Alice and Bob to consider our attack when they judge
whether the plug-and-play QKD system is secure or not.
In the following, we first, in Sec.II and Sec.III, intro-
duce the imperfection of FM and analyze a PFM attack
based on this imperfection. In Sec.IV, we find the mini-
mal QBER between Alice and Bob induced by Eve, when
she uses an optimal and suboptimal POVMmeasurement
strategy to implement the intercept-and-resend attack.
In Sec.V, we give a brief conclusion of this paper.
II. THE IMPERFECTION OF FARADAY
MIRROR
In this section, we first introduce the two way plug-
and-play system briefly, and show why the FM can be
used to compensate the birefringence of fiber. Then we
show how the imperfection of FM can be used by Eve to
spy the secret key.
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FIG. 1: (Color online)The simple diagram of plug-and-play
system [14] and Eve’s attack. LD:laser diode, Cir: circula-
tor, BS: beam splitter, PBS: polarization beam splitter, Att.:
attenuator, PM: phase modulator, FM: faraday mirror, QC:
quantum channel, D1 and D2: single photon detector, PC:
polarization controller. Part(a) shows plug-and-play system
without Eve. Part(b) shows Eve’s PFM attack. In the dia-
gram, we only show how Eve obtains the information of Alice.
c and d are two time modes sent to Alice by Eve and we as-
sume only mode c is modulated by Alice in this paper.
A. Plug-and-play QKD system
A simple diagram of plug-and-play system [14] without
Eve is shown in Fig.1(a). Bob sends a strong reference
pulse to Alice, which is horizontally polarized. The pulse
will be divided equally into two parts by a beam splitter
(BS), noted as a and b. A polarization controller (not
shown in Fig.1) is used to change the polarization of b
to guarantee it can pass the polarization beam splitter
(PBS) totally. Generally speaking, due to the birefrin-
gence of fiber, the polarization of a and b are random,
when they arrive at Alice’s zone sequentially. However, a
FM can be used to compensate the birefringence of chan-
nel automatically. When a and b return Bob’s zone, their
polarization are orthogonal to that of their initial state.
Then they will travel the other path and interfere in BS.
Therefore, FM plays an important role in compensating
the birefringence of fiber. Now, we show why the FM can
do this.
The FM is a combination of a θ faraday rotator and
an ordinary mirror. In ideal situation, θ = 45◦ and the
Jones matrix of FM can be written as:
FM(45◦) =
1√
2
[
1 1
−1 1
] [
1 0
0 −1
]
1√
2
[
1 −1
1 1
]
= −
[
0 1
1 0
]
.
(1)
Thus the polarization of the outgoing state is always
orthogonal to that of the incoming state, regardless of
the input polarization state. It is easy to prove that for
any birefringence medium, the following equation always
holds, that is:
T (−θ′) · FM(45◦) · T (θ′) = ei(ϕo+ϕe)FM(45◦), (2)
where T (θ′) and T (−θ′) are the Jones matrices of bire-
fringence medium when the photon travels forward and
backward the quantum channel, which are given by:
T (±θ′) =
[
cos(θ′) ∓sin(θ′)
±sin(θ′) cos(θ′)
] [
exp(iϕo) 0
0 exp(iϕe)
]
×
[
cos(θ′) ±sin(θ′)
∓sin(θ′) cos(θ′)
] ,
(3)
where ϕo, ϕe are the propagation phases of ordinary and
extraordinary rays and θ′ is the rotation angle between
the reference basis and the eigenmode basis of the bire-
fringence medium. Eq.(2) shows clearly that, in the ideal
situation, the plug-and-play system can compensate the
birefringence of medium automatically.
Here, we remark that although the plug-and-play sys-
tem will suffer from the “untrusted source” problem in
which the source incoming Alice’s zone is controlled by
Eve totally, the security has been rigorously proved in a
few recent works [15–20]. Thus, this problem is not con-
sidered in this paper and the additional setups for Alice
to monitor the “untrusted source” are also not shown in
Fig.1.
B. PFM attack
In the discussion above, we have shown that, in the
ideal situation, FM can be used to compensate the bire-
fringence of fiber automatically. However, in practical
case, the angle of the faraday rotator in FM is not exact
45◦. Then Eq.(1) is not valid and the Jones matrix of a
practical FM should be rewritten as:
FM(θ) =
[
cos(θ) sin(θ)
−sin(θ) cos(θ)
] [
1 0
0 −1
] [
cos(θ) −sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
]
=
[
cos(2θ) −sin(2θ)
−sin(2θ) −cos(2θ)
]
= −
[
sin(2ε) cos(2ε)
cos(2ε) −sin(2ε)
]
≡ FM(ε),
(4)
where θ = pi/4 + ε is the angle of faraday rotator in a
practical FM. Generally speaking, ε is small. For exam-
ple, in the center wavelengths 1550nm and 1310nm, the
maximal rotation angle tolerance is 1◦ (at 23◦C ) for the
popular FM produced by Newport [21] and General Pho-
tonics [22]. Thus, in this paper, we only consider the
case that |ε| ≤ 1◦.
3When FM is imperfect, the birefringence of fiber can
not be compensated totally and additional QBER will be
induced. However, the additional QBER is just the minor
bug of the practical FM, since ε is very small. The major
one is that the imperfection of FM will leave a loophole
for Eve to spy the secret key. In the following, we show
how Eve can use this imperfection, which is called PFM
attack in this paper.
The PFM attack is shown in part(b) of Fig.1. In the
diagram, we only draw the major part of Eve’s attack
that how Eve probes Alice’s information. In order to do
this, Eve sends two time modes c and d to Alice. Note
that the two modes should be coherent , which can be
obtained by splitting a pulse with a BS like the gener-
ation of mode a and b sent by Bob. The polarization
of the two modes should also be the same, which is con-
trolled by Eve’s polarization controller(PC). We assume
the polarization state of photon that sent to Alice by Eve
is given by:
in =
[
α β
]T
. (5)
Note that the polarization of incoming state is controlled
by Eve totally, thus α and β are any complex number
that satisfy |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. Simply, we only consider the
the special case that Eve sets α = 1 and β = 0 in this
paper.
It is easy to prove that the Jones vectors of output
polarization state for the two time modes can be written
as:
outc =
[
eikδ 0
0 1
]
· FM(ε) ·
[
eikδ 0
0 1
]
· in
= −eikδ
[
sin(2ε)eikδ
cos(2ε)
] (6)
outd = FM(ε) · in = −
[
sin(2ε)
cos(2ε)
]
(7)
where outc and outd are the Jones vectors of mode c and
mode d. Here we assume that only c is modulated by
Alice. k = 0, 1, 2, 3 are the indices of the four states
modulated by Alice. δ is the phase difference between
states, in the standard BB84 scheme, δ = pi/2, but if Eve
combines our attack with the phase-remapping attack
[12, 13], δ ∈ [0, pi/2]. Note that, in Eq.(6) and Eq.(7),
we assume that Eve can compensate perfectly the bire-
fringence of Alice’s zone by controlling her polarization
controller. Although it is still challenging as the bire-
fringence at Alice’s side fluctuates, we can ignore this
fluctuation, since the interval that Eve’s photon incom-
ing and outgoing Alice’s zone is much smaller than the
time for a remarkable fluctuation of the birefringence.
Therefore, when FM is imperfect, the states sent by
Alice are not the standard BB84 state which are noted
as |φk〉 = (eikpi/2|c〉 + |d〉)/
√
2, but four new states that
can be written as:
|Φk〉 = 1√
2
{sin(2ε)ei2kδ|cH〉+ cos(2ε)eikδ |cV 〉
+ sin(2ε)|dH〉+ cos(2ε)|dV 〉}.
(8)
It is easy to check that, when ε 6= 0, the dimension of
Hilbert space spanned by the four new states of Eq.(8)
is three. In order to show it clearly, we let |H〉 =
cos(2ε)|H ′〉 + sin(2ε)|V ′〉 and |V 〉 = −sin(2ε)|H ′〉 +
cos(2ε)|V ′〉, and note |cH ′〉 = |e0〉, |cV ′〉 = |e1〉, |dV ′〉 =
|e2〉. Note that ε can be known by Eve exactly, thus the
transformation from {H,V } to {H ′, V ′} can be imple-
mented by Eve. Then Eq.(8) can be rewritten as:
|Φk〉 = 1√
2
{sin(2ε)cos(2ε)(ei2kδ − eikδ)|e0〉
+ [sin2(2ε)ei2kδ + cos2(2ε)eikδ]|e1〉+ |e2〉}.
(9)
Eq.(8) and Eq.(9) show clearly that the information
encoded by Alice appears not only in the time mode (c
and d), but also in the polarization mode (H and V ). Ob-
viously, Eve can obtain more information from the four
new states than the four standard BB84 states. Thus if
Alice and Bob are unaware of the imperfection of FM,
it will leave a loophole for Eve to spy the information
encoded by Alice. Here, we remark that, although the
true states sent by Alice is shown by Eq.(8), Eve can
not get more information from Eq.(8) than Eq.(9), since
the transformation from Eq.(8) to Eq.(9) is just one uni-
tary operation which can not give her more information.
Thus, in the following, we use Eq.(9) but not Eq.(8) to
continue our discussion.
III. PFM ATTACK BASED ON AN
INTERCEPT-AND-RESEND ATTACK
When FM is imperfect, the states sent by Alice are
not the standard BB84 states but the states shown by
Eq.(9). Thus, Eve can use the operators belonging to 3-
dimension Hilbert space to measure the four states. Note
that, for the case that FM is perfect, the operators that
can be used by Eve should be limited in 2-dimension
Hilbert space. Generally speaking, when a new imper-
fection of system is found by Eve, she can combine all
imperfections of the system and attack strategies to max-
imize her information of the key. However, in this paper,
we only consider the intercept-and-resend attack, which
shows clearly that the generated key will be compromised
due to the imperfection of FM.
We consider the following attack, Eve intercepts each
pulse returned from Alice’s zone and measures it with
five POVM operators {Mvac,Mi|i = 0, 1, 2, 3} which sat-
isfy the condition that Mvac +
∑3
i=0Mi = I. When Eve
obtains the outcome corresponding to Mi, she resends a
standard BB84 state |φi〉 to Bob. Here we add an ad-
ditional POVM operator Mvac, since Eve needs not to
resend all the pulses to Bob due to the loss of channel
between Alice and Bob. Thus when she obtains the out-
come corresponding to this operator, she blocks the pulse
and sends a vacuum state to Bob. Obviously, the above
attack is the same as the general intercept-and-resend at-
tack. However, in our attack, the dimension of Mi and
Mvac is three instead of two.
4Obviously, Eve can not distinguish the four states |Φk〉
certainly, since they are linearly dependent states. In the
following, we estimate the QBER between Alice and Bob
induced by Eve. According to the measurement theory,
the conditional probability that Bob obtains |φj〉 given
that Alice sends the state |Φk〉 is given by:
P (j|k) =
3∑
i=0
P (B = j|E = i)P (E = i|A = k)
=
3∑
i=0
|〈φj |φi〉|2Tr(Miρk),
(10)
where P (B = j|E = i) is the conditional probability
that Bob obtains |φj〉 given that Eve resends the state
|φi〉, P (E = i|A = k) is the conditional probability that
Eve obtains outcome corresponding to Mi given that
Alice sends |Φk〉, ρk = |Φk〉〈Φk|. Note the fact that
|〈φj |φi〉|2 = δi+2,j + (δi+1,j + δi+3,j)/2, where δi,j is the
kronecker delta function. Therefore, the QBER between
Alice and Bob induced by Eve’s attack is given by:
eB =
∑3
k=0
∑3
j=0,j 6=k P (j|k)∑3
k=0
∑3
j=0 P (j|k)
=
∑3
i=0 Tr(MiLi)∑3
i=0 Tr(Miρ)
, (11)
where
Li =
1
2
ρi+1 + ρi+2 +
1
2
ρi+3
ρ = ρ0 + ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3.
(12)
Generally speaking, the optimal strategy for Eve is to
find a set of optimal POVM operators to minimize the
QBER, eB. Although Eq.(11) is the same as Eq.[3] of
Ref.[12] formally, the dimension of POVM operators is
three in our attack instead of two in Ref.[12]. Further-
more, in Ref[12], the authors remark that “the constraint∑3
i=0Mi ≤ I is not necessary to minimize eB, since
any solution to this unconstrained problem can always
be scaled down sufficiently to satisfy the constraint”.
This conclusion is also true in our case. However, we
remark that although the constraint
∑3
i=0Mi ≤ I will
not change the QBER, it will bound the probability that
Eve obtains an valid outcome successfully, here the valid
outcome means that Eve obtains outcome corresponding
to Mi but not Mvac. The probability that Eve obtains
an outcome successfully is also an important parameter
to describe Eve’s attack, which is given by:
PEsucc =
1
4
3∑
i=0
Tr(Miρ), (13)
where the division by four is that Alice sends one of the
four states with equal probability.
Therefore, in order to find the optimal strategy for
Eve, she needs to solve the optimization program with
two penalty functions, which can be written as:
min eB
max PEsucc
subject to Mi ≥ 0
Mvac ≥ 0
Mvac +
∑3
i=0Mi = I
(14)
where Mi ≥ 0 and Mvac ≥ 0 mean the matrix Mi and
Mvac are positive. In fact Eve can not obtain the optimal
value of the two penalty functions simultaneous, which
will be shown in the following. Thus, in the following,
we consider the QBER eB as the major object and PEsucc
as a minor one.
IV. SIMULATION
According to the above analysis, the optimal strategy
for Eve is given by the solution of Eq.(14). However, it is
hard to find the global optimal solution of Eq.(14) [26].
Thus, in this paper, our analysis follows the method of
Fung et al. [12], who uses this method to analyze the
security of QKD system for the phase-remapping attack.
In this section, we first introduce the method of Fung
and then estimate the QBER between Alice and Bob
with numerical simulation. We remark that, although
the method considered here is just suboptimal for Eve,
it shows clearly that the secrecy of generated key will be
compromised by our PFM attack. The numerical simula-
tions show that, under PFM attack, the QBER between
Alice and Bob induced by Eve is lesser than 25% which
is the QBER under the general intercept-and-resend at-
tack. Furthermore, when Eve combines our attack with
the phase remapping attack, the QBER induced by her
attack can be lesser than 11%, which is the maximal tol-
erable QBER under the collective attack [23].
A. The suboptimal strategy for Eve
According to Ref.[12], the suboptimal strategy can be
described as:
Step one: Instead of distinguishing the four states sent
by Alice, here Eve only distinguishes ρ0 from {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3}
and ρ3 from {ρ0, ρ1, ρ2}. It means that, Eve uses three
POVM operators {Mvac,M0,M3} to measure the states
sent by Alice. When she obtains the outcome correspond-
ing to M0 or M3, she resends a standard BB84 state |φ0〉
or |φ3〉 to Bob, otherwise, she resends a vacuum state
to Bob. It can also be considered as a special case of
the intercept-and-resend attack described in Sec.III that
M1 =M2 = 0.
Step two: Instead of finding the global optimal POVM
operators to minimize eB, Eve uses the following POVM
operators to measure the states sent by Alice, which are
5given by:
M0 = xρ
−1/2|C0〉〈C0|ρ−1/2
M3 = xρ
−1/2|C3〉〈C3|ρ−1/2
(15)
where |C0〉 or |C3〉 is the eigenvector of matrix
ρ−1/2L0ρ
−1/2 or ρ−1/2L3ρ
−1/2 corresponding to the min-
imal un-zero eigenvalue λ0 or λ3, x is the maximal real
number that ensure the matrix Mvac = I − M0 − M3
is positive. Obviously, {Mvac,M0,M3} are positive and
sum to the identity, thus they are valid POVM operators.
Here we give two remarks about this suboptimal strat-
egy for Eve.
Remark one: Although the global solution of Eq.(14)
is not obtained in this paper, it does not matter, since our
goal is to show the loophole caused by the imperfection
of FM, but not to try to give a strict security analysis.
Thus if we can find a set of POVM operators that can
show this loophole, it is enough. If Eve who has unlimit
computation power wants to optimize her strategy, she
can solve the optimization program.
Remark two: In the suboptimal strategy described
above, Bob only obtains bit 0 in one basis and bit 1
in other basis. Glancingly, it will give Alice and Bob a
simple method to defeat our attack, since they only need
to estimate the count rate of bit 0 and bit 1 for each ba-
sis individually. However, we remark that, the method
can only defeat our suboptimal strategy, but can not de-
feat a optimal attack caused by the imperfection of FM.
In fact, the suboptimal strategy is just a toy model to
show the security loophole induced by the imperfection
of FM. This suboptimal strategy is also used by Fung et
al. in the phase remapping attack to obtain their main
conclusion (Fig.(4) of Ref.[12]). If a true Eve exists, she
can solve the optimal programme Eq.(14) and find the
optimal strategy for her. Then, the probability that Bob
obtains bit 0 and bit 1 is equal in two base.
B. Result
Substituting the suboptimal POVM operators Eq.(15)
into Eq.(11) and Eq.(13), it is easy to estimate the QBER
for Bob, eB, and the probability that Eve obtains out-
come successfully, PEsucc. Since Eve can combines the
phase remapping attack [12] with our attack, we set the
phase difference δ ∈ [0, pi/2] in the following discussion.
Here, we remark again that the following results are ob-
tained based on the suboptimal strategy described above.
If Eve can find the global solution of Eq.(14), she can im-
prove the following results. Furthermore, note that ε = 0
is a singular point in PFM attack, since, in this point, the
dimension of Hilbert space spanned by the four states of
Eq.(9) is reduced to two. It means that Eve can not
implement our attack in this point. Thus, this point is
excluded in the following simulation.
Fig.2 shows clearly the probability that Eve obtains
outcome successfully, PEsucc, changes with ε for given δ.
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FIG. 2: (Color online)The probability that Eve obtains out-
come successfully changes with ε for given δ. The fours lines
are obtained by maximizing x of Eq.(15). Note that the
special point that ε = 0 is unconsidered in our simulation.
Since this point is a singular point, in which the dimension of
Hilbert space spanned by the four states of Eq.(9) is reduced
to two. Thus our attack is invalid in this point.
The larger ε is, the easier Eve can load her attack. Here,
we remark that PEsucc can be explained as the maximal
transmittance of channel between Alice and Bob that Eve
can load this attack successfully under the suboptimal
strategy for given ε and δ [27]. For example, when ε = 1
and δ = pi/2, PEsucc = 2.43× 10−3. It means that if Eve
wants to implement this attack successfully, the trans-
mittance of channel between Alice and Bob should be
smaller than 2.43× 10−3, which corresponds to a 124km
long fiber (the typical loss of fiber is about 0.21 dB/km).
Furthermore, PEsucc can also be explained as that, for a
given transmittance of channel, Eve can not exploit the
imperfection of FM that ε is smaller than a given value.
For example, when δ = pi/2 and |ε| < 0.65◦, PEsucc is
smaller than 1.029×10−3. Thus for a 142.5km long fiber
(the transmittance is about 1.017 × 10−3), Eve can not
exploit the imperfection of FM that |ε| < 0.65◦.
The QBER between Alice and Bob induced by Eve’s
attack is shown in Fig.3. It shows that even in the case
that δ = pi/2, the QBER induced by Eve’s attack is much
lower than 25% which is QBER induced by the general
intercept-and-resend attack. It is also lower than 20%,
which is the maximal tolerable QBER in the BB84 proto-
col under the two-way post-processing [24, 25] when Eve
does not exploit the imperfection of FM. Furthermore, if
Eve combines the phase-remapping attack with our at-
tack, she can reduce the QBER to a very small level.
For example, if Eve sets the phase difference δ = pi/8,
the QBER induced by her attack is just 3.57%, which
is lower than 11% that is the maximal tolerable QBER
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FIG. 3: (Color online)The error rate of Bob changes with ε for
given δ. Note that, due to the same reason as Fig.2, the spe-
cial point that ε = 0 is also unconsidered here. Furthermore,
we combine the phase remapping attack with our attack, thus
δ can be smaller than pi/2.
for the BB84 protocol under the collective attack and
one-way post-processing [23]. Then no secret key can be
generated when the QBER estimated by Alice and Bob is
larger than this value. Therefore, it is necessary for the
legitimate parties to consider our attack in a practical
plug-and-play QKD system.
It is interesting that, when δ is given, the QBER in-
duced by Eve is almost constant and independent of the
degree of the imperfection of FM ε, which is shown in
Fig.3 clearly. The main reason is that ε is very small. In
fact, eB will changes with ε slightly, but the difference is
so small that it can be ignored. In order to show the con-
clusion clearly, we consider Eq.(11) with o(ε2). It is easy
to check that, under the suboptimal strategy of Eq.(15),
eB = (λ0+λ3)/2, here, λ0 and λ3 are the minimal un-zero
eigenvalue of ρ−1/2L0ρ
−1/2 and ρ−1/2L3ρ
−1/2. A simple
evolution show that, when δ = pi/2, the three eigenval-
ues of ρ−1/2L0ρ
−1/2 are 1/2, (1±√2/2)(1− 2ε)/2. Thus
λ0 = (1−
√
2/2)(1−2ε)/2 = 0.1464−0.2929ε. The same
result can be obtained for λ3. Therefore, the error rate of
Bob induced by Eve can be written as eB = 0.1464+o(ε),
which shows clearly that eB is constant in order of o(ε).
In fact, the strict numerical simulation shows that, for
given δ, eB is almost constant in order of 10−5 for each
ε. Note that, although eB is almost independent of ε, ε
will affect PEsucc obviously (see Fig.2).
Fig.3 shows that when Eve combines the phase remap-
ping attack with the imperfection of FM, the QBER in-
duced by her attack can be reduced to a very small level.
For example, when she sets δ = pi/4, the QEER is just
4.72%. However, when the QBER is reduced, the prob-
ability that Eve implements her attack successfully will
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The probability that Eve obtains out-
come successfully changes with δ for the phase remapping
attack and our attack. The red line is obtained for the
phase remapping attack according to the method described
in Ref.[12]. The blue and green lines are obtained for ε = 1◦
and ε = 0.5◦, respectively.
also be reduced, see Fig.2. Therefore, when Eve loads her
attack, she should make a trade-off between the QBER
and the efficiency to maximize her information.
In the following, we compare our attack with the phase
remapping attack [12]. The probability that Eve obtains
outcome successfully is shown in Fig.4. It shows that
the probability that Eve implements the phase remap-
ping attack successfully is much larger than that of our
attack. Although Eve can increase the probability that
she implements her attack successfully by increasing the
phase difference δ, it will induce more QBER which is
shown in Fig.5.
Fig.5 shows that, when the phase difference δ is in-
creased, the QBER induced by Eve’s attack will increase
quickly. This conclusion holds for both the phase remap-
ping attack and our attack. However, the QBER under
our attack is much lower than that of the phase remap-
ping attack. For example, when δ = pi/4, eB = 17.7%
for the phase remapping attack, but in our attack, eB =
4.71%.
V. CONCLUSION
In the two-way plug-and-play QKD system, a perfect
90◦ FM can be used to compensate the birefringence of
fiber automatically and perfectly. However, the practi-
cal FM is imperfect. Although the deviation from the
ideal case is small and the QBER induced by this imper-
fection is slight, it will leave a loophole for Eve to spy
the secret key between Alice and Bob. In fact, when the
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FIG. 5: (Color online)The error rate of Bob changes with
δ for the phase remapping attack and PFM attack. In the
simulation, we set ε = 1◦.
practical FM deviates from the ideal case, the dimension
of Hilbert space spanned by the states sent by Alice is
three instead of two. Thus the standard security analysis
is invalid here, some careful strategy should be adopted
by the legitimate parties to monitor this imperfection.
In this paper, we propose a PFM attack in two way
plug-and-play QKD system based on the imperfection
of FM. The results show that, under this attack, the
QBER between Alice and Bob induced by Eve is much
lower than 25%, which is the QBER for the general
intercept-and-resend attack when FM is perfect. Fur-
thermore, when Eve combines the imperfection of FM
with phase remapping attack, the QBER induced by her
attack can be lower than 11%, which is the maximal tol-
erable QBER for the BB84 protocol under the collective
attack and one-way post-processing. Therefore, in the
practical case, the legitimate parties should pay more at-
tention to the imperfection of FM, otherwise, the secrecy
of generated key will be compromised. However, we re-
mark that, although Eve can combine PFM attack with
phase-remapping attack to reduce QBER between Alice
and Bob induced by her attack, the probability that she
can load this attack successfully is dependent on the loss
of channel obviously. In other words, Eve can only imple-
ment PFM attack in long distance QKD system, which
can be estimated in Fig.2 and Fig.4.
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